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COMMENTS
exceptions below). Res judicata is stricti juris, and the second
suit should not be barred when there is any doubt of the appli-
cability of Article 2286.188 The judgment has the authority of the
thing adjudged only as to matters put in issue by the pleadings 8 9
and actually decided by the court.10
Exceptional Cases
In three types of cases, however, the judgment is conclusive
not only of the matters raised and decided in the suit, but also
of all matters which might have been pleaded therein. This is
true only when the first suit was a
(1) Petitory action."'
(2) Partition action. "
(3) Suit for injunction against the execution of a judgment
or a sale under executory process.1 8
(a) But the judgment is not conclusive of grounds for
injunction which are matters of public policy (such as the
homestead exemption), and which were not urged in the first
suit. 4'
CLAUDE O'QUIN
DISCOVERY PROCEDURE AND ITS
LOUISIANA COUNTERPARTS
"What is truth?" a Biblical character once asked. Pilate's
troubled query summarizes at once the problem and the ideal of
every system of law-how to discover the truth about the matter
presently in controversy. Unfortunately, in the field of procedure,
the ideal has been subordinate to the "trial-by-battle" practice in
which right is on the side of the heaviest and most skilled legal
artillery." Procedural law has presented the strange anomoly of
creating, on the one hand, devices apparently aimed at disclosing
the true basis of opposing claims, and yet, on the other carefully
138. See supra, p. 500 and note 42.
139. See supra, pp. 500-501 and note 43.
140. See supra, p. 505 and note 60.
141. See supra, pp. 498 and 512 and note 32.
142. See supra, pp. 498-500, 512-513 and note 36. It is believed that Wells
v. Files (discussed supra, p. 500) carries this rule too far, and will not be
followed.
143. See supra, pp. 501 and 512 and note 46.
144. See supra, pp. 502-503 and 512.
1. Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure
(1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1179, 1180; Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading
Problem (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 169.
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aiding each side in secreting from the other the very information
which it purports to reveal.
In the past two decades this traditional conflict has given
ground in many jurisdictions to liberalized rules not based on
such inherently hostile conceptions. The development of fact-
discovery and the actual use of its most modernized versions
makes an interesting comparison with Louisiana methods.
DEVELOPMENT
It is seldom in a law suit that one party is surprised by the
nature of the claims of the other party; what he is really in-
terested in discovering prior to trial is the evidence which will
be used to support these claims, and which he must be prepared
to meet on the trial.2 This is equally true for defenses which are
set up. Pleadings have from time immemorial been the accepted
basis of notification to the opposite partyA Because it is char-
acteristic of pleading that allegations are in a generalized form
(ultimate fact as contrasted with evidentiary fact), that the
pleader can always claim more than he can prove, and that the
denials of the defendant are no more concrete or bona fide than
the allegations of the plaintiff,* every system of law has made
some effort, however restrained, to supplement the knowledge
gained from the pleadings by some form of discovery.
The seeds of modern discovery are recognizable in all legal
systems, but so stunted by restrictions that they hardly seem
consonant with a practical and adequate means of fact-determina-
tion. Romano-canonical procedure, which must be credited with
the first comprehensive use of the detached interrogatory, utilized
the interrogatio post litiscontestationem,6 and its subsequent de-,
velopment, positiones, as discovery methods. Positional pro-
2. Sunderland, Trends in Procedural Law (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW RiVIEW
477, 496.
3. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial (1933) 42
Yale L. J. 863.
4. Sunderland, supra note 3.
5. For a scholarly treatment of the entire field of discovery, to which
this comment is greatly indebted, see Millar, The Mechanics of Fact-Dis-
covery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure (1937) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 261,
424.
6. Romano-canonical law also made slight use of the interrogatio ante
ZItcontestationem. According to Millar, the whole topic of preparatory ex-
amination was probably in a large measure of purely doctrinal significance.
See Millar, supra note 5, at 267.
7. Positiones, which supplanted the interrogatories in the early part of
the thirteenth century, were, in form, the interrogatories changed to an
affirmative statement. What the plaintiff or defendant actually did was to
state separately the allegations already contained in his libel, or "cause of
[Vol. !I
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cedure was excellent within its limited field. But restricted as'
it was to the parties themselves, to a form which required the
statement of ultimate facts, and by the necessity for a categorical
answer, it did not operate to actually disclose to the interrogator
any extensive number of facts which he did not already know.
In spite of its limitations, however, Romano-canonical procedure
was the real foundation upon which even the most modern dis-
covery methods are based.9
Chancery, coming later, did not do even as well.10 The clumsy
combination of the interrogatories with eight other parts in the
bill,1 the failure to keep disclosure apart from defensive allega-
tions in the answer, and the relegation of a defendant seeking
discovery from the plaintiff to a cross-bill, 2 all favored conceal-
ment of evidence by the parties rather than frank disclosure.13
Bills in equity and bills of discovery as an aid to actions at
law did little better. While they served to obtain from the oppon-
ent admission of facts which the pleader would be required to
prove (but already knew), it was only incidentally and acci-
dently that they disclosed any evidence which would protect the
pleader from surprise and from unnecessary preparation- for
trial. 4 Except in, a very limited class of cases, no method of
examining witnesses before trial was provided."
As might have been expected, the common law offered little
action." These statements were then read to the opponent, who had to
answer categorically whether he admitted or denied the allegation. Numerous
objections to the positions were open to the opponent. There was some con-
flict as to the effect of failure to answer, but the rule that failure to answer
was affirmation of the positions was finally accepted generally. For a detailed
study of Romano-canonical positiones, see Millar, supra note 5, at 268.
8. Millar, supra note 5, at 274. Of course, the methods then in use may
have been quite adequate for their time.
9. Millar, supra note 5, at 276.
10. Sunderland, supra note 3, at 866; Millar, supra note 5, at 438, 441.
11. The nine parts were: (1) the address to the court, (2) the intro-
ductory description of the parties, (3) the stating part, (4) the allegation of
confederacy, (5) the charging party, (6) the jurisdictional statement, (7) the
interrogating part, (8) the prayer for relief, (9) the prayer for process.
Millar, supra note 5, at 438, n. 266.
12. A cross-bill was in effect a new proceeding. Millar, supra note 5, at
439.
13. Nor was chancery as discriminating as Romano-canonical procedure
in dealing with failure to make the required disclosures. There was no dis-
tinction made between total and partial failure to answer. In either case,
after contempt poceedings had been tried, the bill in its entirety was taken
as confessed, instead of the Romano-canonical method of taking the position
as confessed only to the extent that the opposite party had failed to make
answer. Millar, supra note 5, at 440, n. 277.
14. Sunderland, supra note 3, at 866.
15. Simpson, supra note 1, at 190.
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in the way of discovery.16 The feeble bill of particulars17 fell far
short of removing a suit from the category of a game between
counsel. It provided no real means for examining the adverse
party or for ascertaining the character of testimony to be ex-
pected from adverse witnesses.
The last century saw the development in America 8 of statu-
tory procedures for the examination of adverse parties and the
taking of depositions in the law action itself. Though the statutes
of the different states vary considerably, 9 generally they provide
for mutual examination of the opponent before trial, either by
oral or written interrogatories, 20 for the production of documents
or admissions as to genuineness, and for the taking of depositions
of absent witnesses. Unfortunately, most states have retained the
useless prejudice against a free inquiry into the facts of and by
both sides. As a consequence, the procedure of these jurisdictions
is cramped by objections to the necessity and scope of disclosures
sought, by refusal to allow examination into evidentiary facts,
by confining examination to the party's "own case" and by re-
stricting the class of witnesses whose depositions can be taken.2'
Nor were the federal courts free of this maze of restrictions.
In equity, the old chancery practice was followed until the Fed-
eral Equity Rules of 191222 provided for written interrogaties, to
be filed at any time after filing of pleadings, addressed to the
opposite party, "for the discovery by the opposite party of facts
and documents material to the support or defense of the cause."
Provision was also made for calling on the opponent to admit the
16. Simpson, supra note 1, at 190.
17. For a detailed discussion of the use of the bill of particulars, see
Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 236, § 54.
For a historical background, see Simpson, supra note 1, at 175, n. 8; Van
Hook, The Bill of Particulars in Illinois (1925) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 315. The bill of
particulars under the codes is confined in much the same way that it is at
common law. The adverse party can delay proceedings by objections to the
disclosure sought, and the necessity and scope of examination. The tendency
of the courts is to confine the procedure rather closely, by refusing to allow
examination as to evidentiary facts, or by confining the examination to evi-
dence in support of the examining party's case. See Ragland, Discovery
Before Trial (1932) 120-45; Simpson, supra note 1, at 191.
18. No attempt is made in this comment to show the later developments
of English procedural law. An excellent brief discussion can be found in
Millar, supra note 5, at 442.
19. Ragland, op. cit. supra note 17, at 267-391 (Appendix). See also Id. at
25-26; Millar, supra note 5, at 448.
20. Oral examination is definitely preferred over written interrogatories
in the various states. See statutes collected in Sunderland, supra note 3, at
874, n. 50.
21. Simpson, supra note 1, at 191; Clark, op. cit. supra note 17, at 23, § 9.
22. 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (1928), 226 U.S. (Appendix) 1, 33 S.Ct. xix, 57 L.Ed.
1633 (1912).
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execution or genuineness of any document. However, there was
no provision for oral examination of the opponent, and the
procedure for taking pre-trial testimony of witnesses could be
used in only such restricted circumstances that their value as dis-
covery was slight.2 8
MODERN DISCOVERY
Reform of this haphazard jumble of discovery devices has
proceeded along two general lines of attack: (1) Enlargement of
the scope of inquiry so as to permit examination of any person
with knowledge material to the cause, including the parties
thereto; and (2) improving the mechanics of the discovery pro-
cesses -in order to eliminate the burdensome restrictions of the
old systems .2
A mere enumeration of the discovery devices of modern pro-
cedure would appear to be simply a repetition of old methods; a
detailed study of them will reveal their newly acquired simplic-
ity, scope, and utility.
Depositions25
By one simple but telling stroke, the new Federal Rules of
23. There were four principal depositional devices in the former federal
practices:
(1) The deposition de bene esse, taken after issue was joined and without
leave of court upon notice to the opposite party. Rev. Stats. §§ 863, 865 (1875),
28 U.S.C. §§ 639-641 (1934). It was only "when the witness lives at a greater
distance from the place of trial than 100 miles, or is bound on a voyage to
sea, or is about to go out of the United States, or out of the district in which
the case is to be tried, before the time of trial, or when he is aged and
infirm . . ." that the deposition could be taken. Rev. Stats. § 863 (1875), 28
U.S.C. § 639 (1934).
(2) The deposition dedimus potestatem, taken in " . . any case. . . where
necessary in order to prevent a failure or delay of justice." In the adminis-
tration of this rather vague phrase, the courts followed somewhat the same
considerations as expressly provided for in the deposition de bene esse. United
States v. Cameron, 15 Fed. 794 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1883); Zych v. American Car
& Foundry Co., 127 Fed. 723 (C.C. Mo. 1904).
(3) The deposition taken ". . . in the mode prescribed by the laws of the
State in which the courts are held." Rev. Stats. § 865 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 643
(1934). This was narrowly construed to mean that only the actual procedure
of taking depositions might follow state practice, while the occasions and
grounds for taking them must follow the federal practice. National Cash-
Register Co. v. Leland, 77 Fed. 242 (C.C. Mass. 1896); Hawks v. Yancey, 2 F.
(2d) 471 (N.D. Tex. 1924); Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. .Co., 17 F. (2d)
951 (S.D. Miss. 1927).
(4) The deposition in perpetuam, taken "according to the usages of chan-
cery." Rev. Stats. § 866 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1934). e
24. Sunderland, supra note 3, at 869.
25. In the following discussion of modern deposition-discovery practice,
this comment has made a somewhat detailed survey of the relevant sections
of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are illustrative of the
most liberal advances in this field. Note will also be taken of any substantial
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Civil Procedure"' have wiped out the entanglements of former
practice in regard to depositions.27 They provide for almost un-
limited freedom in the taking of depositions, both oral and writ-
ten, with restrictions only on their use.2 8 The former allows the
utmost freedom of discovery; the latter protects the well-estab-
lished preference for oral testimony over written statements for
use in court. To see how this operates in practice, it is necessary
to consider: 29 (1) Who may be examined? (2) When may the
procedure be used? (3) How will the examination be conducted?
(4) What is its scope? and (5) Under what circumstances may
the deposition be used at the trial?
The provisions of the new Federal Rules that "the testimony
of any person whether a party or not" may be taken "for the
purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for
both purposes"8° open wide the gates, and abolish the illogical
restrictions formerly imposed on the taking of depositions. As a
result, any person, whether a party or not, having information
relevant to the case, may be questioned.81
Although discovery in America had advanced considerably
beyond the chancery practice of having the interrogatories
coupled with the pleadings, the modern rules loosen the reins
still more in providing for taking depositions as a matter of
course after issue is joined, and even before "an answer" is filed
by leave of court.82 The height of liberality, discovery before
difference between the provisions of the new Federal Rules and those of Illi-
nois, which has one of the best state discovery statutes.
26. The new Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States were authorized by Congress in 1934. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28
U.S.C.A. § 723(b), 723(c) (Supp. 1939). They became effective on September
16, 1938.
27. Rules 26-33. Rule 12(e) provides for a motion for bill of particulars.
The purpose of such relief is to obtain only such information as is required
by the moving party in order to enable him to plead. It is not intended as an
alternative or supplement to the discovery provisions of Rules 26-37, and
consequently its use is narrowly limited. Bicknell v. Lloyd-Smith, 25 F. Supp.
657 (E.D. N.Y. 1933); American La France-Foamite Corp. v. American Oil
Co., 25 F. Supp. 386 (D.C. Mass. 1938); United States v. Schine Chain Thea-
tres, Inc., 63 Decisions on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9 (W.D. N.Y.
1940), and cases cited therein. See Holtzoff, Twelve Months Under the New
Rules of Civil Procedure (1939) 85 Congressional Record, Appendix 728.
28. Pike and Willis, supra note 1, at 1187. Rules 26, 30, 31.
29. The outline herein is patterned after that employed by Pike and
Willis, supra note 1, in their excellent discussion of the new Federal Rules.
30. Rule 26.
31. Rule 30(b) gkves the judge of the court in which the action is pending
power to prevent abuse of this broad right to take depositions. See Moore
and Friedman, Federal Practice Under the New Rules (1938) 2574. This
power will undoubtedly not be used to defeat the broad purposes of the dis-
covery processes, however.
32. Rule 26(a).
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pleading, is not provided for,33 though it might be worked out
by throwing up a skeleton pleading, taking the desired deposi-
tions, and then amending.3 4
By providing for the taking of oral,"3 as well as written 6
interrogatories, the new Rules take advantage of the recognized
superiority of oral over written examination, yet retain the writ-
ten interrogatories for any needed cases. The constitutional re-
quirement of notice to "every other party" to the action of the
time, place and *Party to be examined, is of course contained in
the statute.3 7 At the taking38 of oral depositions, objections to
questions are noted on the record and evidence taken subject to
such objections.3 9
Perhaps the most troublesome depositional problem has been
that of the scope of examination. The taking of depositions de-
veloped within the walls of the notorious "fishing expedition"
rule-that discovery must relate to the party's own case and
cannot be used to "fish" into that of the opponent. In line with
the general theory that a complete revelation is desirable, the
scope of examination under the new Rule is restricted only by
the requirement that the information sought be "relevant to the
33. Apparently, Rule 27, providing for perpetuation of testimony was not
intended as a discovery device. See remarks of Prof. Edson R.. Sunderland,
Hon. William D. Mitchell, and Mr. James A. Pike, Proceedings of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Institute on Federal Procedure (1938) 292-3. The absence
of any reference to discovery similar to that contained in Rule 26 ("... for
the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both pur-
poses.") and the requirement that the petition set out the substance of the
testimony expected to be elicited from each witness substantiates this. See
Pike and Willis, supra note 1, at 1193.
However, necessity for an effective means of discovery prior to the filing
of pleadings is of little importance under the new Federal Rules compared
to that of code-pleading states. The difference lies in the form and effect of
the pleading. Under the new Federal Rules (Rules 7-16) pleadings are in-
tended principally as notice to the opposite party of the claim that is pre-
sented; under the system of fact-pleading established by the codes of the
various states, the party is tied down to the set of facts pleaded. Thus, in one
case, discovery is not necessary before the pleadings are filed, because they
do not later restrict the scope of the discovery-examination in preparation
for trial. On the other hand, the factual basis of the plea is stated, and then
discovery is sought on the basis of what is already known. In the latter case,
the cart of pleadings is placed squarely before the horse of discovery. See
infra, p. 536 for discussion of this problem as applied to Louisiana.
34. Pike and Willis, supra note 1, at 1194.
35. Rule 30.
36. Rule 31.
37. Rules 30(a), 31(a).
38. Rule 28 provides for persons before whom depositions may be taken.
39. Rule 30(c). Thus, even testimony which is objected to is useful for
discovery.
If a witness refuses to answer, however, the relevancy of the question
must be determined before he can be forced to do so. Rule 37(a).
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subject matter involved in the pending action."' 0 The test of rel-
evancy, it has been said, is whether the matter inquired of may
possibly be competent at the trial, not whether it will be.41 This
broad referent extends the horizons of permissible examination
far beyond what was once possible. How wide a range of ex-
amination was contemplated by the framers is shown by the
provision for inquiry as to the names of the opponent's wit-
nesses.42
The rules as to the use 4 of discovery depositions are of little
concern to a study of the discovery process. The usefulness of
depositions in this regard lies in taking the evidence, not its in-
troduction at the trial. It is to be noted, however, that taking the
testimony of a deponent (who may be a party or not) does not
make that person the witness of the interrogator." This is of
paramount importance, in that a party may use depositional dis-
covery freed from the handicap of making the deponent his own
witness, with the resulting restrictions on impeachment and
mode of examination.
Discovery of Documents5
Documentary evidence is of primary importance in every
case. No system of discovery would be complete which did not
provide some means for ferreting out the documentary evidence
of the opponent for inspection in order to prevent surprise and
to allow a proper preparation of the case for trial. The Illinois
statute" is illustrative of all the best features of modern pro-
cedure on this point.
Its provisions are simple. Any party may apply, either before
or after issue is joined, for an order directing any other party to
40. Rule 26(b). In one of the first cases to be decided under the new
deposition-discovery procedure, Moscowitz, J., said: "Limitations which have
been placed upon deposition-taking . . . such as the necessity of having the
affirmative upon the issues upon which examination is sought, finds no basis
in the new Rules. It will not avail a party to raise the familiar cry of Ifishing
expedition.'" (Italics supplied.) Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F.
Supp. 80, 82 (E.D. N.Y. 1938).
41. Pike and Willis, supra note 1, at 1442.
42. Rule 26(b). ".... the deponent may be examined regarding ... the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
The Illinois statute does not contain such a broad provision.
43. Rule 26(b) states the conditions under which the depositions may be
used.
44. Rule 26(f).
45. While the new Federal Rules contain very liberal and adequate pro-
visions for the discovery of documents, they leave a great deal of discretion
to the judge. Consequently, for the purposes of this comment, the more de-
tailed Illinois statute was used as the subject for analysis.
46. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, §§ 259.17, 259.18.
[Vol. II
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any cause or matter to file a sworn list of all documents, including
photographs, books, accounts, letters, and other papers, which
are, or which have been in his possession, material to the merits
of the matter in question. The party to whom the order is directed
shall list the documents in two schedules: (1) All those which he
is willing to produce, and the names and addresses of the persons
now in control of them; (2) those which he is unwilling to pro-
duce, with a statement of the reasons for his objection, and the
names and addresses of the parties now in possession.
The documents contained in Schedule 1-those the opponent
is willing to produce-may be introduced in evidence without
any further proof of genuineness. These documents may, at any
time not inconvenient to the party in possession, be inspected
and copied. If permission to do so is refused, an order of court
enforcing this right may be obtained. The statutory teeth for the
enforcement of the order are very sharp.4 7
As to documents in Schedule 2, an order permitting the party
seeking discovery to inspect and copy them may be obtained
from the court. Refusal to obey by the other party, or by the one
in possession at the instigation of that party is followed by ser-
ious consequences to the recalcitrant. 8 No document listed in
Schedule 2 may be introduced in evidence by the person listing,
unless by leave of court.
The possibility of simply failing to list certain documents is,
of course, covered also. Any document not listed shall be inad-
missible as evidence for the party failing to list. Furthermore,
an order may be obtained directing the other party to show cause
why certain specified documents which were not listed should
not be produced.
This rather simple procedure enables either party to make a
blanket call for all material documents; to make easy use of the
documents produced; to force production of documents which
either are not listed or which the party is not willing to produce;
and to tie the opponent down by preventing him from using un-
47. ". . . if leave so to do is unreasonably refused by the party listing it
or by any other party at the instance of or by collusion with the party listing
it, a motion may be made for an order that the party listing such document
shall be non-suited or his complaint dismissed, or that any pleading or part
thereof filed by him shall be stricken out and judgment rendered accordingly,
or that he may be debarred from any particular claim, defense, recoupment,
set-off, counterclaim or replication respecting which discovery Is sought, or
an order of attachment as for contempt of court may be issued." Ill. Ann.
Stats. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 259.17 (2).
48. Ill. Ann. Stats. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 259.17 (3).
1940]
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listed documents in evidence. Consequently, every document used
at the trial will have been previously discovered by the party
seeking to do so.
A corollary to the documentary-discovery procedure permits
a party to exhibit to his opponent at any time before trial, any
paper material to the action with a request for admission of
genuineness. 49 If the opponent fails to admit, and the genuineness
is later proved, the costs of such proof are taxed against him. 0
Any lawyer who has gone through the arduous task of formally
proving the genuineness of all his documentary evidence will
appreciate the usefulness of these provisions.
Advantages of Modern Discovery Procedure
There are numerous striking advantages to such a liberalized
system of discovery. Ifi the first place, it sweeps overboard the
fallacy which has insidiously fastened itself on procedural law
for centuries, to the exasperation of many lawyers, and the dis-
gust of laymen who came in contact with it-that justice can best
be promoted by allowing each side to hide from the opponent
as much of its case as possible.51 No reasoning could ever disprove
the fact that the more completely facts and evidence are aired,
the more properly the case can be prepared, the more quickly
disposed of and the more equitably decided. Furthermore, that
bugaboo of the law, perjury, is dealt a heavy blow by freedom
of discovery. 52 It is commonly argued that if one party knows
what evidence the other intends to use, there is danger that re-
49. Ill. Ann. Stats. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 259.18 (1). Provision is
also made for calling on the other party to admit certain specific facts,
which can be fairly admitted without qualification or explanation as stated
in the notice. The penalty for failure to admit is the payment of the costs of
proving that fact, if the opponent later proves it.
"... if such production shall be refused by the party listing said docu-
ments or by any other party at the instance of or by collusion with the party
listing them, a motion may be made for, and the court may enter an order
that the party listing such document shall be nonsuited or his complaint dis-
missed, or that any pleading or part thereof filed by him shall be stricken
out and judgment rendered accordingly, or that he may be debarred from
maintaining any particular claim, defense, recoupment, set-off or counter-
claim or replication respecting which discovery is sought."
50. The new Federal Rules are very similar. See Rules 36, 37(c).
Rule 35 makes provision for physical and mental examination of persons.
This discovery device is undoubtedly of great value in numerous cases.
51. "There is no objection that I know why each party should not know
the others case," said Judge Taft, afterwards Chief Justice of the United
States, while sitting as a state judge in Ohio. Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co., 9
Ohio Dec. 809, 812 (1887).
52. See Ragland, op. cit. supra note 17, at 124-5; Sunderland, supra note
1, at 867-68; Simpson, supra note 1, at 204-5; Pike and Willis, supra note 1,
at 1437.
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butting evidence may be manufactured to meet it. Instead, how-
ever, of encouraging perjury, a liberal system of mutual dis-
covery goes far to prevent it. By the exercise of his right of
discovery, a party who has been forced to reveal his claim or
defense may tie down his opponent, and the latter's witnesses,
to a definite position before any effective "artificial" story can
be perfected.
It is well known that canonical law recognized three distinct
purposes for its positional procedure: the proper preparation of
the suit, the speedier expedition of cases, and the increase in
danger of urging an action or defense devoid of legal basis.53
Modem discovery practice, the direct descendant of this pro-
cedure, far surpasses its parent in the accomplishment of these
purposes.
The completeness of disclosure afforded by free discovery
not only prevents surprise at the trial, but eliminates a consider-
able amount of wasted effort in preparing for matters which may
never come up. Furthermore, while depositions of important wit-
nesses may have been taken principally for the purpose of dis-
covery, this testimony at the same time is available for use at
the trial in case the witness is then absent.
Discovery also serves as high-grade oil for speeding up the
legal machinery. By eliminating issues, shortening proof, and
clarifying the conflict, the speed of actual trial is stepped up con-
siderably. A further very important factor in this regard, is the
elimination of non-meritorious cases. Experience has shown that
it is difficult to bluff with a pair of legal deuces when all the
cards of evidence are up. Once the facts are revealed, a great
many cases are settled out of court.5 4 A still more lethal weapon
for combating the evil of "nuisance value" claims and defenses
has been forged by coupling with discovery a procedure for sum-
mary judgment, obtainable by either party in any type of action.
This new partnership will undoubtedly prove very effective.55
While ultra-conservative judges may, in some minor respects,
prevent the complete freedom of discovery contemplated by
modern rules, there can be no doubt that the broad principles of
53. Pike and Willis, supra note 1, at 1452.
54. Ragland, op. cit. supra note 17, at 252-4; Hardgrove, Reduction of
Trial Issues under Wisconsin Practice (1927) Proceedings of Wisconsin Board
of Circuit Judges, 35, 39.
55. Rule 56 of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pike and
Willis, supra note 1, at 1455.
1940]
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frankness and fairness embodied in them will go far to overcome
the effects of the "crude heredity" of procedural law.
LOUISIANA DISCOVERY DEVICES
Louisiana's discovery vehicle has numerous faults in design.
The greatest handicap to its progress is, however, not structure,
but the restricted area of its operation which results from the
present system of fact-pleading. In common with all fact-pleading
statutes,56 the Pleading and Practice Act5" provides for a state-
ment of so-called ultimate facts on which the suit is based. It was
contemplated that this form of pleading would not only give
notice of claim to the court and opponent but also frame the issue
or "cause of action" involved. The requirements of Louisiana
procedure that discovery be made after 8 this binding fact state-
ment and within its restricted scope, is in effect requiring dis-
covery to explore only within a previously charted area.
It is here that modern discovery differs from Louisiana pro-
cedure. Pleadings of the new Federal Rules are informal state-
ments of the case, intended principally as notice of claim to the
court and opponents. The real work of clarifying the issues and
revealing the true bases of the contest is done by the discovery
processes, which are not held within a previous fact-statement.5 9
Thus, while even under the most modern rules it is generally 0
true that discovery is permitted only after the filing of a petition
and service of process, the effect of the pleadings on this sub-
sequent action is entirely different from the restrictive Louisiana
practice. It should be remembered that every Louisiana device
for discovery is encompassed within this limitation.
56. Clark, op. cit. supra note 17, at 150, § 38.
57. Pleading and Practice Act: La. Act 157 of 1912, § 1, as last amended
by La. Act 27 of 1926, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1483]. Prior to the Practice
Act of 1912, the general provisions for pleading were found in Arts. 169-176
and Arts. 316-329, Code of Practice of 1870. While these articles are still in
force, the form of pleading for which they provided-somewhat similar to
that of the new Federal Rules-has been entirely changed by the provisions
of the Practice Act.
58. Perpetuation of testimony is possible before institution of suit. Its
failure to be an effective discovery device is discussed, infra, p. 540.
The petition may be amended at will before issue is joined. Tarver v.
Quinn, 149 La. 368, 89 So. 216 (1921); Self v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 178 La. 240, 151 So. 193 (1933), and cases cited therein. But this right
may be cut off at any time by the filing of an answer, after which, amend-
ment is only permitted by leave of court, providing the amendment does not
change the issues. Art. 419, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Tremont Lumber Co.
v. May, 143 La. 389, 78 So. 650 (1918). Consequently, the use of information
discovered after pleading by incorporating it in an amended petition is too
uncertain for any practical purposes.
59. See supra p. 531 for scope of examination under the new Federal Rules.
60. For exceptions, see Ragland, op. cit. supra note 17, at 54-61.
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Depositional Discovery
(a) Interrogatories on Facts and Articles
Both plaintiff and defendant are permitted by Article 347 of
the Code of Practice to annex either to their petition or answer
written questions known as interrogatories on facts and articles.6 1
When the Code of Practice of 1825 was formulated, an interested
party was incompetent to testify in his own cause.62 The inter-
rogatories provided by the Code,68 being the only possible way
to question the opponent," were consequently very valuable.
After statutory provision was made for cross-examination of the
opponent as a hostile witness, 5 these interrogatories fell into
disuse. Recently, however, they have gradually regained favor
as one Louisiana approach to modem discovery procedure.
But it is a rather distant approach. In the first place, this de-
vice is one of the prisoners within the bars of fact-pleading.
Since the questions must be filed along with the petition or
answer,6 they must necessarily be material or relevant to these
pleaded facts.67 Furthermore, the flexibility and effectiveness of
oral cross-examination is lacking. While there is provision for
answering orally in court,6 the answers must be categorical,"9
and in response to written questions.7 0 It must be noted also that
interrogatories on facts and articles are permissible only between
the parties.
71
61. Art. 347, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
62. Abat v. Gormley, 3 La. 238 (1832).
63. Arts. 347-356, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
64. Abat v. Gormley, 3 La. 238 (1832).
65. La. Act 126 of 1908. The present statute is La. Act 115 of 1934 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) §§ 1995-1995.2J.
66. Art. 347, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
67. Art. 350, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Kenner v. Peck, 2 La. Ann. 938
(1847).
68. Art. 351, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
69. Arts. 349, 353, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
Since the party interrogated must answer categorically, the questions
must, of course, be framed to that end. Interrogatories that cannot be an-
swered categorically can, therefore, be either disregarded or, by rule, stricken
out.
The harshness of the rule providing for a categorical answer is some-
what mitigated by the provision of Article 353 of the Code of Practice that
"... the party interrogated may state some other facts tending to his defense,
provided they be closely linked to the fact on which he has been questioned."
For cases interpreting the words "closely linked," see Bond v. Bishop, 18 La.
Ann. 547 (1866); McLear & Kendall v. Succession of Hunsicker, 29 La. Ann.
539 (1877).
70. Art. 348, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
71. Art. 347, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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(b) Depositions
Were it not for the ever-present shadow of the pleadings,
Louisiana's procedure for taking oral depositions72 would perhaps
be adequate as a means of discovery from anyone not a party to
the suit. A wide scope of examination in the taking of testimony
is, however, the heart of successful discovery, without which it
has little life.78
A valuable addition to the possible uses of oral examination
of parties to the litigation was made in Soule v. West.7 4 Through
the technique of combining statutes, the court reached the con-
clusion that a party could orally cross-examine his non-resident
opponent as a hostile witness, at any time after service of peti-
tion and citation. 5 The rule of this decision affords the defendant
a rather effective means of discovery from his adversary before
filing his answer; its value to the plaintiff as a pre-trial discovery
device is somewhat less, since he has already framed his pleading.
However, in Harrelson v. New Orleans-Roosevelt Corp.,76
the court balked at extending the rule so as to allow cross-
examination of an opponent who was a resident of the parish in
which the suit was pending. Had it done so, Louisiana would
have a fair substitute for modem discovery-examination of the
opposite party.77 As in Soule v. West,75 the defendant attempted
to use a combination of statutes to show statutory sanction for
his action. This device the court summarily rejected on the
ground that the statutes did not permit such examination before
issue joined.79 Prior to that time, reasoned the court, the judge,
72. La. Act 143 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1998.1-1998.5]; and see La.
Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 613-619, 621-622 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1996.1, 1999-2006].
73. See supra, p. 531. It must be remembered that the new Federal Rules
use the same general forms of depositions that were used formerly. The im-
provement is in the use of these forms.
74. 1M0 La. 1092, 158 So. 567 (1935).
75. La. Act 115 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1995-1995.2] (cross-examina-
tion of the opponent); La. Act 143 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) 88 1998.1-1998.5]
(providing for taking depositions of witnesses who live out of the parish);
and La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 613 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1996.1] (taking of
deposition at any time after service of petition and citation) were the stat-
utes construed together in reaching the decision. The court said that Article
359 of the Code of Practice is merely declaratory of the fact that parties are
not in a position to proceed with the trial of the case until issue has been
joined;'it is not in conflict with § 613 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, allow-
ing commissions to take testimony to issue before joinder of issue.
76. 184 La. 551, 166 So. 671 (1936).
77. The restricted scope of examination caused by the fact-pleadings,
supra, p. 536, would still have prevented the freedom of examination neces-
sary for modern discovery.
78. 180 La. 1092, 158 So. 567 (1935).
79. Apparently, defendant based his action on a combination of Act 115
of 1934 (cross-examination of opponent) and Article 351 of the, Code of Prac-
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not knowing the issues, could not rule on the relevancy of the
testimony."0
Nevertheless, it is possible that discovery, from a resident
opponent before trial might be sanctioned by a combination of
statutes different from that advanced by counsel in the Harrelson
case.81 If the clear statutory authority of these statutes be shown,
the fabric of the Harrelson decision would hardly stretch far
tice (requiring answer to interrogatories in open court). The court said that
such construction was impossible, since Act 115 of 1934 was "independent
legislation" and Article 351 applied only to interrogatories on facts and
articles.
80. "But to permit litigants to examine their resident opponents in open
court, before the issue is defined, would be to permit the taking of evidence
in its final form without advising the trial judge of the issues in the case and
placing him in a position to rule on its relevancy and admissibility." Har-
relson v. New Orleans-Roosevelt.Corp., 184 La. 551, 555, 166 So. 671, 672 (1936).
This reasoning of the court aptly illustrates the results that will be
reached when discovery is held within the bounds of the pleadings. In effect,
the court is saying that it must be possible when taking the evidence to
determine its admissibility, under the pleadings, at the trial. But there is
express statutory authority for the proposition that the admissibility of testi-
mony is not to be determined when it is taken, but when it is used at the
trial. Section 616 of the Revised Statutes provides that "it shall be the duty
of the clerk to take down the question of the party, the answer of the wit-
ness, as well as objections made to the same, as a part of the proceedings
had, the regularity of which or any part of which objection shall be deter-
mined by the court in which the. depositions are to be made on the trial of
the cause." This is the approach of the new Federal Rules: freedom in taking
the depositions; restrictions on use determined only when the evidence is
offered at the trial. See supra, p. 530.
81. La. Act 115 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1995-1995.2] (cross-exam-
ination of opponent), La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 614-619, 621-622 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 1999-2006] (taking depositions of resident witnesses), and La. Rev.
Stats. of 1870, § 613 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1996.11 (depositions before issue
joined) would seem to permit the cross-examination of a resident opponent
before issue joined as clearly as the statutes used in Soule v. West permitted
the cross-examination of a non-resident opponent.
It is the impression of many attorneys that §§ 614-622 of the Revised
Statutes do not provide for taking depositions of resident witnesses. This
seems to be entirely unfounded. Section 615 says that ". . . said party shall
apply to the clerk of the court in which said suit is pending, to take the
testimony of his witnesses in writing, and thereupon said clerk shall proceed
to take the testimony of such witnesses in writing. ... (Italics supplied.)
§ 618.gives the clerk power to force attendance of the witnesses. The only
reasonable interpretation of such language is that it contemplates the taking
of depositions of persons residing in the parish where the suit is brought, by
the clerk of that parish. Nor is such a procedure in conflict with that author-
ized by Article 430 of the Code of Practice. Lykiardopoulo v. New Orleans
& C. R. Light and Power Co., 127 La. 309, 53 So. 575, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 976
(1910). Consequently, it seems that the combination of statutes set out above
would be the same as those used in Soule v. West, except that, since the
opponent is a resident of the same parish, §§ 614-622 of the Rev ised Statutes
are used instead of Act 143 of 1934.The question of whether the sections of the Revised Statutes have not
been overruled by the subsequent statutes for taking depositions might be
raised. The language of the court in Soule v. West in using § 613, and the
fact that these statutes are not in conflict with any subsequent provisions
for taking depositions seem to prove conclusively that they are still in force.
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enough to hide from the court's view a solution which was never
contemplated in that case.
The provisions for taking depositions on written interroga-
tories8 2 add little of value to Louisiana discovery procedure.
Along with other discovery devices, they stand in the universal
shadow cast by fact-pleading on the free examination of wit-
nesses. Here, too, as in the field of oral depositions, the problem of
using written interrogatories to cross-examine an adversary be-
fore trial is unsettled. While a non-resident opponent can be so
examined, 83 the unsatisfactory doctrine of the Harrelson case
throws a doubt on the use of a similar procedure for a resident
adversary.
(c) Perpetuation of Testimony"'
Unfortunate from the standpoint of discovery was the de-
cision in the case of State ex rel. Batt v. RomeA5 There it was
held that the right to cross-examine an adversary is confined to
suits already pending in court, and cannot be used in perpetuat-
ing testimony as a means of discovery."" Here, indeed, would a
contrary decision have given Louisiana a fairly workable system
of discovery. By taking a liberal stand, the court could have per-
mitted the use of a discovery device which would be free of the
restrictive pleadings87 and would serve as a fair counterpart of
modern adversary-discovery. As it is, perpetuation of testimony
can be used only in circumstances so limited that its usefulness
to discovery is seriously impaired.8
82. Arts. 424 et seq., La. Code of Practice of 1870.
83. Interstate Rice Milling Co. v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 176 La.
308, 145 So. 548 (1933).
84. Perpetuation of testimony Is possible both before and after suit Is
filed. The former is permitted by Code of Practice Article 440, as amended
by Act 112 of 1914; the latter by Articles 138 and 430. It Is the former which
is of greatest interest in a study of discovery.
85. 172 La. 856, 135 So. 610 (1931).
86. "The title of the act, the use of the words 'parties litigant' in the text,
especially in connection with what immediately follows those words ... have
led us to the conclusion that the right of cross-examination of an opponent
authorized by Act 126 of 1908 may be exercised only after the institution of
suit, and then only in the court having jurisdiction thereof." State ex rel.
Batt v. Rome, 172 La. 856, 860, 135 So. 610, 611 (1931).
87. Because, under Code of Practice Article 440, as amended, the testi-
mony would be taken before suit Is filed. A simple amendment to Article 440
providing that the testimony of a prospective opponent could be perpetuated
on cross-examination before trial-the procedure which was tried in the Batt
case-would add greatly to the effectiveness of this device as a discovery
weapon. The requirement that the cause of action be first set forth would
still restrain somewhat the scope of examination. Any possible abuse could
be easily prevented by reserving discretionary power in the judge to forbid
the taking of such testimony in unwarranted cases.
88. Art. 440, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 112 of
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Discovery of Documents
(a) Prayer for Oyer
A prayer for oyer can be made only of the instrument on
which the action is based."9 Nor is the remedy open to any one
but the defendant. 0 It is evident that such a limited device is
far from being a counterpart to modern documentary-discovery.9 1
(b) Subpoena duces tecum
There are several reasons why the subpoena duces tecum
also fails to measure up to modern discovery standards. The
worn-out "fishing expedition" adage is the controlling rule.
Before a subpoena will issue, not only must certain particular
books or papers be pointed out,92 but there must likewise be an
allegation that all other sources of information have been ex-
hausted.99 Discovery is virtually outlawed by the further pro-
vision that a sworn statement must be made of the facts which
will be proved by the documents subpoenaed.9 4 This presents the
same dilemma to documentary-discovery that the pleadings do to
deposition-discovery-the facts to be discovered must be set forth
before the right will be granted to discover them.
9 5
1914, providing for perpetuation of testimony before institution of suit, is
not only subject to the decision of State ex rel. Batt v. Rome, but also can
be used only by first setting forth the cause of action on which he is about
to sue or be sued.
Testimony can be perpetuated, under Article 430 of the Code of Practice,
only when the witness resides in the parish where the cause is pending, and
is old, infirm, or about to depart from the state.
89. Art. 175, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 162 of
1924; Bernard v. International Harvester Co., 144 So. 77 (La. App. 1932).
90. Art. 175, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 162 of
1924.
91. Supra, p. 532.
92. Art. 473, La. Code of Practice of 1870; State ex rel. Franklin & A. R.
Co. v. Allen, 104 La. 301, 29 So. 114 (1900).
93. Louisiana Farm Bureau Cotton Growers' Co-Op Ass'n v. Bacon, 159
La. 169, 105 So. 278 (1925). But see Keiffe v. La Salle Realty Co., 163 La. 824,
112 So. 799, 53 A.L.R. 82 (1927), where it was intimated that if it appears on
the face of the record that there are other sources of information, the sub-
poena will be denied.
94. Art. 140, La. Code of Practice of 1870. If the documents are in pos-
session of the opposite party, and are not produced in obedience to the court
order, the stated facts are taken as confessed. Columbia Fire Co. v. Purcell,
25 La. Ann. 283 (1873); De Brueys v. Burns, 144 La. 707, 81 So. 259 (1919);
Louisiana Farm Bureau Cotton Growers' Co-Op Ass'n v. Bacon, 159 La.
169, 105 So. 278 (1925). However, if the writ is directed to a third party, a
stranger to the pending litigation, the penalty for noncompliance is con-
tempt; the sworn facts are not taken for confessed. See Equity Savings &
Loan Co. v. Boisfontaine, 115 La. 842, 848, 40 So. 241, 243 (1905).
95. Louisiana possesses nothing which corresponds to the modern prac-
tice of presenting facts and documents to the opposite party for acknowl-
edgment of genuineness.
Nor does Louisiana have any express provisions for physical examina-
tions of persons. However, a very effective rule of evidence makes it neces-
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CONCLUSION
In modern perspective, the winding course which Louisiana
discovery took in reaching its present unsatisfactory state is
clear. Because mechanical defects in the available devices so
limited their operation that they failed to accomplish the task
of frankly revealing the issues and bases of suit, fact-pleading was
adopted. It was hopefully expected that this system would
remedy the prior procedural deficiencies, a job which it has
proved inherently incapable of doing.96 As a result, present Lou-
isiana procedure is not only weighted down with traditional
limitations, but also totters under the burden of a broken-down
pleading machine that was itself supposed to carry the load of
discovery-a situation which judicial decision has done little to
rectify. Compared to the modern streamlined processes for frank
pre-trial disclosure, Louisiana is still in the "horse-and-buggy"
age of discovery.
FRANK S. CRAIG, JR.
sary for a party to submit to examination before trial. Briefly, the rule
prohibits a party who has refused to submit to examination from introducing
his own evidence as to his physical condition. Kennedy v. New Orleans Ry.
& Light Co., 142 La. 879, 77 So. 777 (1918); Crutsinger v. B. F. Avery & Sons,
Inc., 146 So. 789 (La. App. 1933), and cases cited therein.
96. For an excellent illustration of the break down and failure of fact-
pleading, see Clark's remarks on the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules (1938) 223-224.
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